Denver Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 2 Symposium: Labor and Employment
Law: A New Focus for the Eighties

Article 17

January 1985

Local No. 82 Furniture Movers v. Crowley: Title I Relief When Title
IV Claims Are at Issue under the LMRDA
David E. Doran

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
David E. Doran, Local No. 82 Furniture Movers v. Crowley: Title I Relief When Title IV Claims Are at Issue
under the LMRDA, 62 Denv. U. L. Rev. 675 (1985).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

LOCAL No. 82 FURNITURE MOVERS V. CROWLEY'
TITLE

I

RELIEF WHEN TITLE IV CLAIMS ARE AT
ISSUE UNDER THE

LMRDA

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959' (LMRDA) to eliminate improprieties on the part of
labor union management 2 , and to provide rank and file union members
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in union activities and decisions. 3 Toward this end, title I of the LMRDA sets forth a "Bill of
Rights," which, among other things, guarantees union members' equal
rights in electing union officials as well as the right to assemble and
speak out on candidates. 4 Title IV of the LMRDA also addresses the
topic of elections, although its requirements are more specific. 5 The
remedies provided in each, however, are not consistent 6 and the overlap
created by these titles has resulted in diverse lower court
interpretations.7
Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers v. Crowley 8 is the Supreme Court's latest
attempt to clarify the LMRDA title I-title IV overlap problem. The
Court held in Crowley that the invalidation of a union election, to protect
rights guaranteed by title I, while the election is being conducted, is not
an "appropriate" remedy under title I. 9 Setting aside an election, the
Court ruled, is a remedy available only under title IV of the LMRDA.10
The impact of Crowley upon the circuit courts will vary depending on
their respective treatments of this "overlap" problem. This comment
will show that the Crowley decision, in all likelihood, will have a minimal
effect on the future decisions of the lower courts as they decide whether
1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186, 401-531 (1982), [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 401(c).
3. American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1964).
4. LMRDA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
5. LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1982).
6. Compare LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982) with LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C.
§ 482 (1982). Section 102 provides that actions against labor union management may be
initiated in federal district court by any person whose rights have been violated under title
I. Section 402, on the other hand, requires that complaints be filed with the Secretary of
Labor, who in turn may then decide whether filing a civil action is appropriate under the
circumstances.
7. See generally, Note, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act: The "Twilight
Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and The Guarantees of Titles I and V, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1105, 1124-35 (1974). This comment, although not specifically focusing on the diversity of lower court interpretations, nonetheless discusses the various tests developed by
the courts in trying to deal with the overlap problem.
8. 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984).
9. Id. at 2568.
10. Id. at 2571.
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title I relief can be sought when title IV claims also are at issue. If anything, in some circuits at least, the Crowley decision may make it easier
for individual union members to obtain title I relief.
I. BACKGROUND

The LMRDA, originally introduced as the Kennedy-Ives Bill" , was
enacted after a committee headed by Senator McClellan 12 discovered
abuses by labor union leadership which often resulted in a lack of democratic practices by the unions.' 3 The Kennedy-Ives Bill was rejected in
1958 but was reintroduced in 1959 as the Kennedy-Ervin Bill. 14 Its

election procedures provisions appear in the final version of title IV.
The remedy of relying upon the Secretary of Labor to take action after
an election, currently found in title IV, was the exclusive remedy then
suggested for relief under the LMRDA from all election abuses. 15 The
reason for relying upon the Secretary of Labor, as opposed to permitting individual lawsuits by aggrieved union members, was to allow unions maximum flexibility in resolving internal disputes without the fear
16
of frivolous suits being brought during the election.
Members of Congress, however, were concerned from the bill's inception about the adequacy of the relief afforded by reliance on the Secretary of Labor. Senators Goldwater and Dirksen objected, when the
bill was introduced, to the lack of protection of individual union members' rights 17 and introduced a bill, ultimately rejected by the Senate,
which would have provided more protection under title IV. 18 The alternative of private enforcement under title IV appeared in the House version of the bill 19 , although this provision was eliminated when the bill
20
went to the Joint Conference Committee.
Title I was added as an amendment by Senator McClellan to provide more protection for individual union members' rights. 2 1 This
amendment added a "Bill of Rights" but still required that suits be
brought by the Secretary of Labor. 22 The amendment passed by a one
vote margin. 23 Two days after the McClellan amendment was passed,
Senator Kuchel introduced a new "Bill of Rights" which gave individual
!1.

S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 10,615 (1958).

12.
13.

The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field.
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1959), reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 at 401-02

(1959)
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

[hereinafter cited as NLRB Legislative History].
S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
Id. at §§ 302-03.
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (minority views).
105 CONG. REC. 1259, 1272-84 (1959).

19. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB Legislative
History, supra note 12, at 727.
20. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1959) (joint conference committee
report on S. 1555).
21.
22.
23.

105 CONG. REC. 6475-76 (1959).
105 CONG. REC. 6476 (1959) (§ 103).
105 CONG. REC. 6492-93 (1959).
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union members standing to sue under title 1.24 This amendment was
overwhelmingly approved and replaced the earlier McClellan amend25
ment, ultimately becoming title I of the LMRDA.
Title I relief, therefore, is now enforced by individual suit brought
in federal district court. 2 6 Title IV relief, on the other hand, requires
that an aggrieved union member file a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor, who has the discretion and exclusive authority to sue to remedy
any violation under title IV. 27 There is very little legislative history to
indicate which relief provision to use, that of either title I or title IV,
when the relief sought overlaps both provisions. In particular, Congress
gave no clear direction as to whether individual union members have
standing to sue when abusive election procedures, addressed in title IV,
28
also violate the rights granted in title I of the same act.
The Supreme Court's decision in Calhoon v. Harvey29 marked the
first time the Court addressed the title I-title IV overlap problem.
Therein, the Court held, in essence, that any complaint by individual
union members alleging title I violations may not stand if those allegations are, in substance, violations under title IV. 30 The Court noted that
challenges to nomination eligibility rules are fundamentally title IV
claims. 3 ' The district court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to hear the

case because title IV provides that the Secretary of Labor is the only
party with standing to sue under this title.3 2 The Court, however, did
not hold in Calhoon that individual members were not entitled to bring
suit, even during an election, where the claims are substantially based
upon title I.
Eight years later, the Court once again discussed the extent to
which an individual member has standing to sue when title IV claims are
at issue. Although not specifically addressing the title I-title IV controversy, the Court ruled in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers 33 that an individual member could intervene in an action already brought by the
Secretary of Labor under title IV. Though the Court reiterated that the
administrative remedy is exclusive, it went on to state that, under certain
circumstances, title IV does not bar an individual member from inter24. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. '§ 102 (as amended), 105 CONG. REC. 6720 (1959).
25. 105 CONG. REC. 6727 (1959).
26. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
27. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
28. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2566-67; see also Comment, Titles I & IV of the LMRDA: A
Resolution ofth Conflict of Remedies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 166, 175 (1974) (commentator asserts
that the legislative history indicates that Congress was barely aware of the existence of the
overlap problem).
29. 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the union from conducting
an election, alleging that the union by-laws deprived members of certain rights in the nomination procedure).
30. Id. at 138-41.
31. Id. at 138.
32. Id. at 140.
33. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
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vening in a title IV proceeding brought by the Secretary.34 In so doing,
the Court recognized that union members may have rights which the
35
Secretary cannot adequately protect.
The circuit courts' treatment of the LMRDA title I-title IV overlap
problem in light of the Supreme Court's decisions has varied. It appears, therefore, that the Court's early decisions have left considerable
discretion to the lower courts to determine when a title I individual
member suit could be brought when title IV claims were also at issue.
This diversity is shown by a review of some of the circuit court's title Ititle IV overlap cases before Crowley.
The Second Circuit in Schonfeld v. Penza36 ruled that, consistent with
Calhoon, there is no title I jurisdiction where election eligibility is being
challenged. Claims must be made first to the Secretary of Labor.3 7 The
court did go on to hold, though, that where substantive violations under
title I are asserted, no appeal to the Secretary is necessary.3 8 The test
adopted by the Schonfeld court to deal with the title I-title IV overlap
problem limited title I actions to cases in which the union has an established history or articulated policy of deliberate suppression of
39
dissent.
In Depew v. Edmiston40 , the Third Circuit narrowly construed Calhoon
and developed another test to deal with the overlap problem. The court
held that when discrimination in the nominating and voting rights of the
members is the "core of the controversy," the complaint has sufficiently
alleged a title I claim. 4 1 The court distinguished the case at hand from
Calhoon, stating that the plaintiffs in this case alleged discrimination in
the election process; they did not challenge the eligibility requirements
which were at issue in Calhoon.4 2 The Third Circuit, therefore, reversed
the district court's holding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the title I claim. 4 3 The DePew decision was discussed in a subsequent Third Circuit case, Amalgamated Clothing Workers Rank and File v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Joint Board.4 4 The court stated, in dictum,
that merely because actions by union management may constitute violations of both title I and title IV, pre-election suits by individual members
are not precluded. 4 5 The Calhoon decision does not prohibit title I suits
34. Id. at 536-37 (the intervention must be limited to claims which are consistent with
claims already asserted by the Secretary of Labor).
35. Id. at 538-39. See also, Pre-ElectionRemedies Under the Landrum-GriffinAct, supra, note
7, at 1121 (This Note includes a discussion on the limitations of title IV relief.).
36. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 902.
38. Id. at 903 (allegations raised the question of whether free speech and association
rights were infringed).
39. Id. at 904.
40. 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967).
41. Id. at 712-13. The Third Circuit was relying upon the equal rights provision of
title I. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982).
42. 386 F.2d at 710.
43. Id. at 715.
44. 473 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 1306.
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46
simply because they are related to election matters.
The Sixth Circuit, in McGuire v. Grand International Division of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 47, seemed to suggest a broader, more
prohibitive test than the Second Circuit based upon Calhoon. The McGuire court, citing Calhoon, held that the individual union member's complaint, as in Calhoon, asserted claims which were substantively title IV
claims and were, therefore, barred by title IV.4 8 In so holding, however,
the court suggested that title I relief may never be available when title IV
49
violations are at issue.

The Seventh Circuit approach to the title I-title IV overlap problem
is similar to that taken by the Sixth Circuit. In Driscoll v. International
Union of OperatingEngineers, Local 139 50, the court held that disputes relating to eligibility requirements fall exclusively within title IV, even
when the eligibility requirement appeared to be a direct restraint on
plaintiffs free speech rights protected by title I. 5 ' The Driscoll court
stated that only "one exception to the broad mandate of Calhoon" existed: 5 2 where the union management had established a history of suppression so as to constitute a title I violation. 53 The court in Driscoll
54
stated such a history did not exist in this case.
McNail v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen 5 5 set forth
the Eight Circuit's approach to the title I-title IV overlap problem. The
court relied upon Calhoon, ruling that the mere assertion of title I violations cannot invoke title I jurisdiction if they are essentially title IV
claims. 56 But the court seemed to suggest a more lenient analysis for
dealing with the overlap problem more consistent with the Second and
Third Circuits. In ruling that the title I claims were substantially title IV
claims, the Eight Circuit, citing the Second Circuits's Schonfeld decision 5 7 , noted that the district court dismissed the title I claims only after
evidence was presented which failed to establish discrimination proscribed by title 1.58
46. Id.
47. 426 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1970) (union member complained that his candidacy for
office was prevented by irregularities in the election process).
48. Id. at 507.
49. Id. at 508 ("Insofar as McGuire alleges election violations specifically dealt with in
Title IV, we hold that the procedures of Title IV must be invoked, notwithstandinga possibe
concurrent offense under Title
I.") (emphasis added).
50. 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974) (candidates and
members were required to execute a non-communist affidavit as a condition to eligibility).
51. Id. at 686. The union's non-communist affidavit requirement appears to at least
suggest a colorable claim under title I which guarantees that every union member "...
shall have the right . . . to express any views, arguments, or opinions. . . ." LMRDA
§ 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1982). See also infra note 139.
52. 484 F.2d at 687.
53. Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973). See supra text accompanying notes
36-39.
54. 484 F.2d at 688.
55. 549 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1977).
56. Id. at 540.
57. Id. The court relied expressly on Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. 549 F.2d at 540-41.
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The Ninth Circuit, in dealing with the title I-title IV overlap problem, also concentrates on whether discrimination in the election process
exists before a title I claim can be made. 5 9 The test in this circuit is that
Calhoon is the law in the case of eligibility requirements, but where discriminatory application of eligibility rules occur, such a violation falls
directly within the scope of title 1.60
The various circuits have adopted seemingly different tests to deal
with the overlap problem because of the uncertainty caused by the indefiniteness of Calhoon, and the dearth of legislative history on the title Ititle IV overlap problem. This is the legislative and judicial context in
which Crowley was decided.
II.

THE CROWLEY CASE

Plaintiff, Crowley, and others were denied admission at a meeting
set for nomination of candidates for union office in Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers. The reason given by the union was plaintiffs' failure
to produce computerized dues receipts. 6 1 The district court found that
admission had not been denied for such a failure in earlier union meetings. 62 In the two months prior to the November meeting, plaintiff Robert Lunnin demanded that the union hold the elections by open ballot
rather than by the previously used mail-in method. 63 When the union
refused, several members, including plaintiff John Lynch, announced
their intention to run for union office. 6 4 This announcement apparently
led the union to deny plaintiffs admission to the meeting. The district
court found that officers of the Executive Board were admitted without
65
producing any receipts for dues.
After the meeting was called to order, nominations for officers were
the first order of business. 66 Defendant Harris listed the names of members who were eligible for election to local union office and also those
members who could not be nominated for failure to comply with the
union's "24 month rule."' 6 7 The plaintiffs were successful, despite these
obstacles, in nominating Lynch for secretary-treasurer. When the nominations were concluded, however, defendant Griffith, the then-current
59. E.g., Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 454. See also Rollison v. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant and Construction Camp
Employees, Local 879, 677 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1982). In Rollison, the Ninth Circuit seemed
to suggest that the existence of the title IV issues can never affect jurisdiction so long as a
substantial title I claim is also made. Id. at 745.
61. Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers,
Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers, 521 F. Supp. 614, 625 (D. Mass. 1981), afjd, 679
F.2d 978 (lst Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 624.
64. Id. at 625.
65. Id.

66. Id. at 626.
67. Id at 617 n.3. (Article II of the union constitution requires that a member must
be in good standing for the 24 months prior to the election. Good standing includes
payment of dues for each of those 24 months.).
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secretary-treasurer, read Lynch's name as a nominee for president, and
announced his own reelection running unopposed. 6 8 Based on these
events, the plaintiff, Crowley, and several other members of the local
union initiated an action alleging violations of title I and title IV of the
69
LMRDA.
The district court found that the plaintiffs were deliberately denied
their right to attend meetings, nominate candidates, and participate in
union decisions as well as their right to free assembly and expression
protected by title I of the LMRDA. 70 The court concluded that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the title IV claim, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that
the "24 month rule" imposed unreasonable restrictions. 7 1 The district
court acknowledged that title IV claims could be brought only by the
procedure prescribed within that title and ruled that title IV claims
72
could not be heard with title I claims.
As for the claims asserting the denial of rights guaranteed by title I,
the trial court agreed with the plaintiffs. It determined that title I established a remedy that can be used whenever violations of title I occur,
regardless of the possible existence of title IV claims. 73 Accordingly, it
invalidated the ongoing election and issued a preliminary injunction
74
which established very specific procedures for a new election.
The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court. 7 5 It
agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to hear title I claims during
the ongoing election. It also agreed that the mere existence of title IV
claims does not preclude a title I individual member suit whenever title I
76
rights are violated.
The court of appeals concentrated much of its opinion on the issue
of whether the election was "concluded" at the time the action was
brought. 7 7 The district court ordered that the mailed-in ballots remain
unopened. 7 8 Based on that order the circuit court concluded that the
election had not yet "concluded," and aggrieved members could, therefore, assert their title I claims requesting invalidation of the election.7 9
68. Id. at 626.
69. Id. at 617-18.
70. Id. at 626.
71. Id. at 622.
72. Id. (the district court reasoned that Calhoon precluded jurisdiction of title IV
claims even when title I claims are sufficiently alleged).
73. Id. at 623.
74. Id. at 636-37.
75. Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers,
Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), revd, 104 S. Ct. 2557
(1984).

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 989-90.
Id. at 991-94.
Crowley, 521 F. Supp. at 614.
Crowley, 679 F.2d at 993.
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THE COURT'S OPINIONS

Overview

Relying on the exclusivity language in title IV 80 and the "appropriateness" language in title 181, the majority held that the district court's
invalidation of an ongoing election was "inappropriate" relief under title 1.82 In so doing, the majority seemingly broadened the application of
the title IV remedy while limiting the private right of action under title I.
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, believed that congressional intent
shows a strong presumption for enforcing title I rights through private
lawsuits by individual members, even when title IV claims are also at
83
issue.
B.

The Majority

The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Brennan, began its analysis by reiterating its earlier holding in Steelworkers v. Sadlowski 84 that title
I protections do in fact extend to union members during union elections.8 5 After a short discussion on the legislative history of section 102
of title 186, the Court then turned its focus to the language of that section. The Court emphasized the wording of the statute which entitles
persons whose title I rights have been infringed only to relief which is
appropriate under the circumstances 8 7 or to that which is appropriate to
88
any given situation.
The Court also reasoned that title I cannot be read in isolation from
other sections of the LMRDA, particularly in light of the subject matter
covered by title IV of the LMRDA. 8 9 Title IV establishes specific requirements for union elections9" and provides its own procedure for enforcing these requirements. 9 1
The important policy question remaining for the Court to address
was exactly what title I remedies are available to union members while
an election is being conducted? 9 2 Two certainties exist: title IV provides the exclusive remedy for challenging an election that already has
been conducted 9 3 , and, as stated earlier, union members are entitled to
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2571.
Id. at 2575-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
457 U.S. 102 (1982).

85. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2564.

86. Id.
87. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
88. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2564 (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973)).
89. 104 S. Ct. at 2565.
90. LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1982).
91. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
92. Id. at 2564. See also id. at 2566 (Court also notes that the "full panoply of Title I
rights are available to individual union members 'prior to the conduct' of a union
election").
93. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
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title I protections during the course of the election.9 4 Given this context, the Court restated its position of Wertz v. Bottle Blowers Association9 5 ,
that construction of legislation requires a look into the intent and objectives of Congress.9 6 The Court recognized that Congress apparently
did not anticipate the potential for a protracted election process9 7 , but
still gave great weight to the legislative intent placing responsibility for
98
regulating union elections primarily with the Secretary of Labor.
Nothing in the legislative history of title I indicates an intent by Congress to permit individuals to preempt this authority to regulate elections granted exclusively to the Secretary of Labor.9 9 In light of this
history, the Court concluded that invalidation is not an appropriate remedy under a title I action.10 0 Union members, therefore, may allege title
I violations during elections only if the relief requested is "appropriate,"
that is, the plaintiffs are not requesting invalidation or supervision of the
election by the courts.01
In summary, the majority ruled that title I actions may be brought
during the course of an election requesting remedies short of invalidation, but if the relief sought is court invalidation and supervision, aggrieved members are required to pursue the remedy provided pursuant
to title IV and may not use title I for such relief. 10 2 It should be noted
that the Supreme Court spent little time discussing the issue of whether
the election had concluded or was ongoing, the basis of the First Circuit's analysis. 10 3 This issue was not in any way ultimately dispositive of
the case.
C.

The Dissent

Justice Stevens cited Hall v. Cole10 4 for the proposition that section
10 5
102 of title I was intended to make available a panoply of remedies.
He asserted that permitting individual members to seek only limited injunctive relief will allow union officials to commit serious violations of
title I while members have no adequate remedy to correct the situation.' 0 6 This result, according to Justice Stevens, is not consistent with
the purpose of title I. Title I was enacted to promote union democracy. 10 7 The holding by the majority, he asserted, undermines this
94. 104 S. Ct. at 2566.
95. 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968) (citing National Woodwork Manufacturers Association
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967)).
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2566.
97. 104 S. Ct. at 2567.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2569.
102. Id. at 2571.
103. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
104. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
105. 104 S. Ct. at 2572.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 112 (1982)).
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purpose. 108
Section 402 of title IV, according to justice Stevens, was introduced
only to limit the remedies available from state courts. 10 9 He asserted
that Congress did not intend that title I actions be limited by title IV,
which was part of the bill before title I was introduced. I 10 The legislative history reflects a concern over the relationship between federal and
state remedies, not as between private and public enforcement. II
Justice Stevens stressed that title I was introduced subsequent to
title IV. Title I was added because Congress felt that individuals must
have the ability to enforce their rights through a private cause of action."1 2 He quoted Senator Kuchel explaining his proposed amendment, adding a private cause of action to title 1113, after members of
Congress expressed dissatisfaction with relying on the Secretary of Labor to enforce individual rights provided by title 1.114
Justice Stevens distinguished Calhoon' 15 , on which the majority relied, by noting that in that case the Court simply held that title IV, not
title I, regulates eligibility standards of union members running for elective office.' 1 6 In the present case, individual union members stated
claims which the Court conceded fell within title I. Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's view that section 403 of title IV limited the
remedy under section 102 of title I "turns the statute and its legislative
history on their head."' 17 Concluding, Justice Stevens believed that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a new election and
that such relief was appropriate under the circumstances.' 18
IV.

CROWLEY'S EFFECT

The Supreme Court's decision in Crowley does not necessarily invalidate the current holdings of the various circuit courts. The approaches
taken by the circuits to resolve the title I-title IV overlap problem may,
therefore, not be altered by this decision in any significant way. Indeed
Crowley appears to do no more than add another factor for the courts to
consider in overlap situations, and may, in some instances, make it easier for individual union members to obtain title I relief when title IV
issues are also involved.
The Crowley opinion is the first among overlap cases basing its analysis on the "appropriateness" of the remedy being sought under section
102 of title I119, rather than solely on the exclusivity language in section
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 2573.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2574 (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972)).
Id. (citing Finnegan v. Lieu, 456 U.S. 431, 440 n.10 (1982)).
Id. (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 6617, 6620 (1959)).
Id. at 2575.
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
104 S. Ct. at 2575 (citing Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138).
Id. at 2575-76.
Id.
LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
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403 of title IV. 12 0 The Crowley decision will not permit district courts to
interrupt on ongoing election, but it will allow them to fine tune an election, so long as the relief sought is "appropriate."121
The majority in Crowley was justifiably convinced that Congress
clearly intended to consolidate all challenges to elections in the Secretary of Labor. 12 2 Moreover, the Court implied that this is true even for
elections which are not yet concluded. 12 3 The Court made it clear, however, that it does not wish to preclude title I relief during the course of
an election.' 2 4 The Court even provided an example of an abuse which
may be redressed by a district court so long as the election is not
25
delayed or invalidated by the relief requested.1
The legislative history reveals that the primary point of contention
between the opposing points of view in Congress was the extent to
which protection of members' rights may be infringed in order to permit
the maximum amount of union independence.' 26 Title I's "Bill of
Rights" and the individual members standing-to-sue provision were added to the LMRDA in response to the concern over the lack of protection afforded union members under title IV. 12 7 Given this history, and
what the Court said in Crowley, it can be assumed that a district court has
great latitude in providing title I relief short of invalidation. This will
protect member rights and concurrently prevent undue interference in
union elections.
To comply with the relevant Supreme Court decisions, the lower
federal courts must now be concerned with two tests in determining
when title Ijurisdiction is not available when title IV issues also are present. First, do the claims made by the plaintiffs constitute allegations
which are in substance title IV claims? 12 8 Second, does the relief requested substantially delay an on-going election, require setting aside
an election, or seek court supervision of a new election? 129 Aside from
these restrictions on the scope of title Ijurisdiction, the circuits still have
primary responsibility for determining whether the title I relief sought is
"appropriate" in a given case.
Crowley does not appear to substantially alter the Schonfeld exception, that is, the "articulated policy of suppression" requirement estab-

1 30
lished by the Second Circuit.

31
will
Circuits following Schonfeld'

merely need to determine, in addition to whether there is an articulated
120. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
121. See Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2568-69.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2568.
124. Id. at 2568-69.
125. Id. at 2569.
126. Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Aanagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1617, 1623 (1965).
127. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
128. Thereby coming squarely under the analysis ofCalhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134
(1964).
129.

Thereby coming squarely under the holding of Crowley.

130. Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d at 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1973). See also supra notes 36-39
and accompanying text.
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policy or history of suppression by the union leadership, the question of
whether the title I relief sought is "appropriate."
Likewise, the Third Circuit approach applied in DePew' 3 2 is still via33
ble after Crowley. The Third Circuit, along with the Ninth Circuit,'
grants title I jurisdiction so long as discrimination is shown in the nominating and voting of officers. 134 These circuits, according to their reading of Calhoon, first determine whether the violations constitute
discrimination, thereby giving rise to title I claims.' 3 5 If the violations,
however, are challenges to eligibility rules, they are considered title IV
claims. 13 6 Once again, Crowley has little effect, so long as individual
union members request relief which is "appropriate."
The circuits wherein Crowley may make it easier for individual members to seek title I relief are those which seem to preclude title I relief
whenever concurrent title IV claims exist. 13 7 Crowley makes it clear that
title I relief may be granted in some cases involving title IV. 13 8 These
circuits now will have to face the title I-title IV overlap problem that they
avoided when they seemingly decided that title I relief was automatically
39
precluded whenever title IV claims also exist.1

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Crowley again has addressed the title I-title
131. E.g., Driscoll v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 484 F.2d
682, 687 (7th Cir. 1973).
132. Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967). See supra text accompanying
notes 40-46.
133. See Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1980).
134. Depew, 386 F.2d at 712-13.
135. Id. at 712.
136. Id.
137. E.g., McGuire v. Grand International Division of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 426 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1970); Driscoll v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). See also
supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
138. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2564.
139. Crowley certainly will force a reevaluation in the Seventh Circuit. In Driscoll, 484
F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), the Seventh Circuit considered a complaint challenging a union
requirement that all candidates for union office sign a non-communist affidavit. The plaintiff, a potential candidate who refused to sign the affidavit, charged that this requirement
violated his free speech rights. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1982). The
court, giving Calhoon its strictest reading, stated that since plaintiff's "allegations 'basically
relate' to eligibility and charge 'in substance' that he has been denied the right to run for
office in his union, he is therefore stating a cause of action which can be enforced only
under the provisions of Title IV ....
484 F.2d at 686. Because the remedy in this instance involved only eliminating the affidavit requirement, and would not disrupt the election process, the Seventh Circuit's position, in light of Crowley, appears tenuous. As uned
by the Court in Crowley,
[t]he important congressional policies underlying enactment of Title I . . . coipel us to conclude that appropriate relief under Title I may be awarded by a court
while an election is being conducted. Individual union members may propely
allege violations of Title I that are easily remediable under that title without substantially delaying or invalidating an ongoing election.
104 S. Ct. at 2568-69. Title I jurisdiction seems proper, in light of Crowley, because the
plaintiff in Driscoll merely requested limited, nondisruptive review of the eligibility requirement, which clearly appears to have infringed upon the plaintiff's free speech rights protected by title I.
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IV overlap problem. The Court chose not to establish uniform criteria
for evaluating when title I relief can be sought, but merely added an
additional factor to consider, whether the title I relief sought is "appropriate" under the circumstances. It can be assumed, therefore, that the
Court is content to permit the various circuits to work out their own
solutions. The Circuits can continue, for the most part, to rely on their
own case law, although a few circuits may find themselves permitting
more title I actions than they would have were it not for the Supreme
Court's refusal to establish uniform criteria in the Crowley decision.
David E. Doran

